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For reasons not requiring much exposition, 2016 was an annus horribilis for the EU. A 
review of the EU judiciary’s 2016 activity reveals that the constituent courts of the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU), the Court of Justice and the General Court, do not have the luxury 
of existing above the tumult in splendid isolation. In a year in which old and new problems 
for the EU dominated the headlines, these challenges found shape in justiciable controversies. 
In total, the Court of Justice and the General Court delivered 844 judgments in 2016, with the 
Grand Chamber, the Court of Justice’s upper tier, responsible for 42 judgments, representing 
a reduction in the number of judgments compared to previous years.
1
 The growth in the 
CJEU’s personnel continued, with an 11th Advocate-General, Evgeni Tanchev (a Bulgarian), 
taking his place on the Court of Justice, and 22 General Court Judges appointed throughout 
the year, bringing the total number at the General Court to 44.
2
 2016 also saw the abolition of 
                                                          
1 Statistics from InfoCuria. Available online at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en; accessed 
24 March 2017. However, in terms of case completion, the CJEU’s overall activity increased in 2016. CJEU, 
Press Release No 17/17, Luxembourg, 17 February 2017. Available online at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-02/cp170017en.pdf, accessed 24 March 2017.  
2 Article 48 of Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the CJEU provides that the General Court shall consist of 47 
Judges from 1 September 2016 and two Judges per member state from 1 September 2019.  
the Civil Service Tribunal, a specialized court that had adjudicated disputes between the EU 




This contribution seeks to analyze the year’s most significant judgments in terms of impact 
on European integration, with a particular focus on the approaches adopted by the EU 
judiciary in response to challenges facing the EU. In accordance with convention, this 
contribution concentrates on the work of the Grand Chamber. In order to ensure continuity 
with previous years, this contribution confines itself to three subject areas. Section I provides 
a brief overview of the Grand Chamber’s activity in the area of eurozone crisis management, 
before providing a more in-depth analysis of its judgment in Ledra Advertising.
4
 Section II 
examines developments in EU data protection law, particularly the ruling in Tele2 Sverige.
5
 
Section III discusses the Court’s development of EU citizenship rights in 2016. 
 
I. Eurozone Crisis Management   
 
In recent years, the Court of Justice has been called upon to rule on the general compatibility 
of the novel eurozone crisis-management mechanisms developed by EU institutions and the 
euro area states with the EU Treaties. In 2012, in Pringle
6
 (Amtenbrink, 2013, pp. 142–145), 
the full Court ruled that the euro area states could conclude and ratify the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) Treaty and, the Grand Chamber, in 2015, in Gauweiler
7
 (Horsley, 2016, 
                                                          
3 Article 50a of Protocol No. 3. 
4 Ledra Advertising (Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P) ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. 
5 Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson (Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. 
6 Pringle (Case C-370/12) ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.  
7 Gauweiler (Case C-62/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. On 21 June 2016, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(BVerfG) ruled that the OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) programme, if interpreted in accordance with 
the Grand Chamber’s judgment, does not exceed the ECB’s competences or offend against the Bundestag’s 
budgetary competences (2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13). 
pp. 118–122), upheld the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Outright Monetary Transfers 
(OMT) programme. There was another such case in 2016, with the Court in Kotnik
8
 
upholding the validity of the Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication,
9
 which provides 
guidance to member states as to when state aid may be utilized to support banks for the 
purpose of ensuring financial stability. With challenges to the generality of these mechanisms 
exhausted, the contested ground has shifted to their operation, particularly where individual 
rights are affected, a phenomenon observable in 2016. In Ledra Advertising, the Court was 
required to clarify the Commission’s legal obligations in its activities under the ESM Treaty. 
On the same day, the Grand Chamber in Mallis,
10
 which like Ledra Advertising involved 
circumstances surrounding ESM financial assistance to Cyprus, held that a Eurogroup 
statement welcoming an agreement between the ESM and Cyprus on conditionality for 
financial assistance was not amenable to an annulment action under Article 263 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). In Dowling,
11
 the Grand Chamber was confronted with 
what was essentially an indirect challenge to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
concluded between the Commission and ECB, on one side, and Ireland, on the other, setting 
out the conditions for the receipt by the latter of financial assistance under the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). The Court ruled that Directive 77/91/EEC,
12
 
which requires, inter alia, any increase in capital in public limited companies to be decided 
                                                          
8 Kotnik (Case C-526/14) ECLI:EU:C:2016:570. 
9 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2013] OJ C216/1. 
10 Mallis (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P) ECLI:EU:C:2016:702. 
11 Dowling (Case C-41/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:836.  
12 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by member states of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited 
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent [1977] OJ L26/1. 
upon by the general meeting of shareholders,
13
 does not prevent a measure requiring, among 
other things, the increase of the share capital of such a company without a general meeting, 
where such a measure is adopted in the context of a serious disturbance to a member state’s 
economy and financial system which threatens the EU’s financial stability. 
 
As it is the most significant of the aforementioned judgments, in terms of contribution to 
existing jurisprudence and of possible future utilization, the balance of Section I provides a 
detailed analysis of Ledra Advertising. Before proceeding to discuss the ruling, it is necessary 
to describe briefly the background to the issues that the Court addressed. 
 
The ESM as a Judicial Protection ‘Black Site’ 
  
The euro area states’ most enduring response to the currency crisis was the establishment in 
2012 of a permanent intergovernmental organization, the ESM, to provide financial 
assistance to euro area states experiencing severe financing problems.
14
 The ESM is 
extraordinary for at least two, inter-related, reasons.  
 
Firstly, the ESM exists outside of the formal structures of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), but involves the Commission and ECB in influential roles that the EU Treaties did not 
envisage for them. These roles include assessing whether financial assistance is necessary 
where a euro area state requests it, as well as assessing the requesting state’s financing 
needs.
15
 Where financial assistance is to be provided, it is the Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB, and, where possible, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that negotiates the MoU, 
                                                          
13 Article 8(1). The contested measure also offended against Articles 25 and 29.  
14 Article 3 ESM. 
15 Article 13(1) ESM. 
which sets out the conditions upon which the assistance is granted, with the requesting state 
on the ESM’s behalf.
16
 Moreover, the Commission signs the MoU on the ESM’s behalf.
17
 
However, all formal decisions are taken by the ESM’s Board of Governors, comprising the 
finance ministers of the euro area states. It is, for instance, the Board of Governors that 




Secondly, the ESM Treaty closely circumscribes the justiciability of the ESM’s activities. 
While intergovernmental disputes can be ruled upon by the Board of Governors in the first 
place,
19
 and, ultimately, by the Court of Justice,
20
 the ESM Treaty provides no process 
through which individuals who have their rights affected may challenge a formal decision of 
the Board of Governors. Moreover, and this was confirmed in Pringle, the euro area states are 
not obliged to observe the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) when conducting 
ESM activities, since such activities do not involve implementing EU law.
21
 Furthermore, as 
the ESM Treaty does not confer any decision-making powers on the Commission and ECB,
22
 
their ESM activities cannot be challenged by means of an Article 263 TFEU annulment 
action, with the consequence that the contents of a MoU cannot be set aside judicially. This 
makes the ESM something of a judicial protection ‘black site’. When one considers that the 
conditions imposed by a MoU may have profound effects on individual citizens’ rights, this 
aspect of the ESM’s legal architecture is open to criticism.  
 
                                                          
16 Article 13(3) ESM. 
17 Article 13(4) ESM. 
18 Article 13(4) ESM. 
19 Article 37(2) ESM. 
20 Article 37(3) ESM. 
21 As required by Article 51(1) EUCFR. See Pringle (Case C-370/12) at paras 179–180. 
22 See Pringle (Case C-370/12) at para. 161.  
Despite closing the door to challenges to the Commission and ECB’s activities through 
annulment actions, the Court, in Pringle, did leave open one potential form of redress for 
individuals whose rights had been adversely affected by the Commission and/or ECB’s 
exercise of their ESM activities. The Court pointed to Article 13(3) and (4) ESM, which 
require those institutions to ensure that MoUs concluded by the ESM are consistent with EU 
law.
23
 The implication was that an individual could sue under Article 340 TFEU (non-
contractual liability), which requires the EU to make good any damage caused by its 
institutions when performing their duties.
24
 In 2016, the Grand Chamber, in a number of 
joined appeals from the General Court, had the opportunity to elaborate on the Commission’s 
ESM Treaty obligations, and, in particular, the extent to which individuals may obtain legal 
redress for a failure to fulfil these obligations. 
 
Ledra Advertising (Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P) 
 
In Ledra Advertising, the appellants pursued two remedies at first instance. Firstly, they 
sought to annul a number of paragraphs in the MoU on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality concluded between Cyprus and the ESM of 26 April 2013. This MoU related 
to the restructuring and resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank (Laïki) and Bank of Cyprus 
(BoC), the two largest banks in Cyprus, both of which the Commission and ECB had 
assessed as insolvent. The paragraphs aimed to recapitalize BoC and ensure Laïki’s orderly 
liquidation. Cyprus was required to ensure, inter alia, that the insured deposits of Laïki were 
taken over by BoC, and that 37.5 per cent of BoC’s uninsured deposits be converted into 
shares with full voting and dividend rights, with another part of those uninsured deposits to 
                                                          
23 Pringle (Case C-370/12) at paras 164 and 174. 
24 Article 268 TFEU confers jurisdiction upon the CJEU to award compensation in non-contractual liability 
cases. 
be temporarily frozen. These obligations were transposed into Cypriot law in March 2013 in 
advance of the formal conclusion of the MoU. The appellants, all depositors in BoC or Laïki, 
argued that the value of their deposits had diminished because of the inclusion of the 
paragraphs, and, as such, the paragraphs amounted to an unjustified interference with their 
Article 17(1) EUCFR right to property. Secondly, the appellants sought compensation under 
Article 340 TFEU for this diminution, which they alleged had been incurred due to (a) the 
inclusion of the paragraphs, and (b) the Commission’s failure to ensure before signing it that 
the MoU was in conformity with EU law, in accordance with its duties as ‘guardian of the 
Treaties’ under Article 17(1) TEU and its duty under Article 13(3) and (4) ESM.  
 
Unsurprisingly, both the General Court
25
 and the Grand Chamber refused the first relief. 
Rejecting the appellants’ argument that the Commission and ECB were the real authors of the 
MoU, and reiterating Pringle, the Grand Chamber ruled that the impugned paragraphs could 
not be annulled since they were acts of the ESM and, therefore, outside the EU legal order.
26
 
However, turning to the appellants’ compensation claims, the Grand Chamber disagreed with 
the General Court, which had ruled that it could not consider actions for compensation based 
on the paragraphs’ alleged illegality. The Grand Chamber, in contrast, held that the 
Commission’s duties under Article 17(1) TEU, and under Article 13(3) and (4) ESM, require 
it to refrain from signing a MoU whose consistency with EU law it doubts.
27
 Accordingly, the 
Grand Chamber, setting aside the General Court’s orders, ruled that the appellants could, in 
principle, claim compensation against the Commission for its alleged failure to ensure that 
                                                          
25 Ledra Advertising (Case T-289/13) EU:T:2014:981; Eleftheriou (Case T-291/13) EU:T:2014:978; Theophilou 
(Case T-293/13) EU:T:2014/979. 
26 At paras 53–54.   
27 At paras 56–60. 
the MoU was consistent with Article 17(1) EUCFR.
28
 In proceeding to judgment on this 
question, the Court considered whether the Commission had contributed to a sufficiently 
serious breach of the appellants’ property rights. In this regard, the Court confirmed that the 
EUCFR binds EU institutions when acting outside of the EU legal framework.
29
 However, in 
considering whether the Commission had breached the appellants’ right to property, the 
Court, pointing to Article 52(1) EUCFR, observed that restrictions may be imposed on the 
right so long as they genuinely meet objectives of general interest, do not constitute a 
disproportionate or intolerable interference with the right, and do not impair the substance of 
the right.
30
 Referring to Article 12 ESM, which provides that the ESM may offer financial 
assistance only where ‘indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole and of its member states’, the Court proceeded to find that the adoption of a MoU such 
as that at issue corresponded to a general interest of the EU.
31
 The Grand Chamber went on to 
find that the impugned paragraphs did not amount to a disproportionate and intolerable 
impairing of the very substance of the appellants’ right to property. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the Court considered the central role played by financial services in the EU’s 
economy, and the risk of contagion to banks in the member state concerned or in other 
member states where one or more banks fail.
32
 The Court also took into account the objective 
of the measures, and had regard to the imminent risk of financial losses that the appellants 





                                                          
28 At para. 55. 
29 At para. 67. 
30 At para. 70. 
31 At para. 71. 
32 At para. 72. 
33 At para. 74. 
 
On the issue of judicial protection, the judgment is to be welcomed. The Court has imposed 
some level of legal accountability on the Commission where it is exercising ESM Treaty 
activities. It is now clear that the Commission may, in principle, have to compensate 
individuals where it causes them harm by signing a MoU that is inconsistent with EU law, 
specifically EUCFR rights. This is certainly preferable to the General Court’s conclusion, 
which would have placed the Commission’s activities in negotiating and signing MoUs 
beyond judicial scrutiny at the behest of individuals. However, the Grand Chamber’s 
assessment of the appellants’ claims illustrates the remote chances of success for such claims. 
The Court’s consideration of the impugned paragraphs’ proportionality is cursory, and reads 
like the disposal of a foredoomed claim. The Court shows understandable deference to the 
Commission and ECB’s assessment that the contested measures were necessary to ensure the 
euro area’s stability. However, it is evident that once this general interest is established, the 
threshold for arguing any interference with property rights is disproportionate will be 
extremely high. Indeed, having assumed that the objective of the measures was to protect 
euro area stability, and that the appellants would have been exposed to an imminent risk of 
losses had Laïki failed, the Grand Chamber did not even proceed to examine the extent of the 
losses claimed by the appellants. The conclusion must be that the Court will not allow 
individual property rights to jeopardize the functioning of macro-measures of eurozone crisis 
management, save where such measures cause an ‘intolerable’ interference with these rights. 
Reading between the lines, one suspects that the Court will expect a high level of ‘tolerance’ 
from claimants in this regard.  
 
II. Data Protection 
 
2016 saw the Union’s legislature adopt the General Data Protection Regulation,
34
 which 
replaces and repeals Directive 95/46/EC.
35
 The new Regulation, adopted along with Directive 
2016/680/EU,
36
 which governs procedures for the processing of data by competent national 
authorities in criminal matters, will apply from 25 May 2018.
37
 Elsewhere, the EU and USA, 
in reaction to the Grand Chamber’s 2015 judgment in Schrems,
38
 concluded a new agreement 
on data transfer between the EU and USA for criminal law enforcement purposes. It will be 
recalled that Decision 2000/520,
39
 which had previously regulated data transfers between the 
parties to the agreement, was invalidated in Schrems. The new agreement entered into force 
on 1 February 2017.
40
 Moreover, the Grand Chamber gave its ruling in the joined cases Tele2 
Sverige and Watson, thereby providing an important clarification of Digital Rights Ireland,
41
 
one of the Court’s most significant rulings in recent times. This contribution now turns to 
assess Tele2 Sverige. 
 
                                                          
34 Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ 
L119/1. 
35 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ 
L281/31. 
36 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L119/89. 
37 Article 99(2). 
38 Schrems (Case C-362/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
39 2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles 
and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L215/7.  
40 Information concerning the entry into force of the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, 
and prosecution of criminal offences [2017] OJ L25/1. 
41 Digital Rights Ireland (Case C‑293/12) ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
Tele2 Sverige (Joined Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15) 
 
In 2014, in Digital Rights Ireland, the Grand Chamber invalidated Directive 2006/24/EC,
42
 
ruling it an unjustifiable interference with Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR, the rights to privacy and 
the protection of personal data, respectively (Horsley, 2015, pp. 113–116). Directive 
2006/24/EC, adopted after the 2005 London bombings, had required member states to 
introduce laws compelling telecommunications operators to retain specific categories of data 
generated and processed by them for periods not less than six months and not more than two 
years from the date of the communication,
43
 and to allow competent national authorities to 
access such data.
44
 When Digital Rights Ireland sealed the Directive’s fate, one might have 
imagined that national measures transposing its obligations were endangered. However, 
disagreement arose subsequently at national level as to whether the ruling constituted a total 
prohibition on measures imposing general and indiscriminate obligations on 
telecommunications operators to retain electronic communications data. Those arguing that 
the ruling did not constitute such an injunction relied upon Article 15(1) of Directive 
2002/58.
45
 This provision permits member states to adopt legislative measures to restrict the 
scope of rights under that Directive, including the right to confidentiality of 
communications,
46
 where necessary to safeguard, inter alia, national security, defence, public 
security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
                                                          
42 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks [2006] OJ L105/54. 
43 Articles 3, 5 and 6. 
44 Article 4. 
45 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ 
L201/37. 
46 Article 5(1). 
Moreover, Article 15(1) specifically permits member states to adopt measures providing for 
data retention for a limited period justified on the aforementioned grounds.  
 
The joined cases of Tele2 Sverige and Watson arose from challenges before the 
Administrative Court of Appeal, Stockholm and the Court of Appeal of England & Wales, 
respectively as to the validity of national legislation transposing the defunct Directive. The 
Grand Chamber provided rulings on two questions.
47
 First, whether Article 15(1) of Directive 
2002/58/EC, read together with Articles 7, 8 and Article 52(1) EUCFR, precludes national 
legislation, which for the purposes of fighting crime, provides for a general and 
indiscriminate data retention obligation. Second, whether the same EU law provisions 
preclude national legislation requiring access by competent national authorities to retained 
data (i) where access is not restricted to the objective of fighting serious crime, (ii) where 
access is not subject to prior judicial or independent administrative review, and (iii) where 
there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the EU.  
 
Before considering either question, the Grand Chamber dealt with the issue of whether the 
national legislation fell within the scope of EU law, in particular Directive 2002/58/EC.
48
 The 
UK government had argued that the Directive applied to legislation obligating retention of 
data, but not access to it. The Court dismissed this argument, holding that the Directive 
applies to national provisions relating to both requirements.
49
 The Grand Chamber justified 
this by pointing to Article 5(1) of the Directive, which protects confidentiality of electronic 
communications, and Recital 21, which states that the Directive’s aim is to prevent 
                                                          
47 A third question, whether Digital Rights Ireland had interpreted Articles 7 and/or 8 EUCFR in such a way as 
to expand the scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), was hypothetical, and, 
therefore, inadmissible (at paras 126–133). 
48 At paras 65–81. 
49 At para. 76. 
unauthorized access to such data to protect confidentiality.
50
 The Court stated further that 
there is an inextricable link between retention and access, since national legislation imposing 





Moving to the substance of the first question, the Court emphasized that Article 15(1) permits 
member states to derogate from the principle of data confidentiality and should, therefore, be 
interpreted strictly.
52
 The Grand Chamber stated that the list of objectives in Article 15(1) 
permitting derogation from the principle of confidentiality is exhaustive, and any measure 
enacted further to the provision must be interpreted in light of EUCFR rights.
53
 The 
obligations imposed by the national legislation at issue, the Court continued, raised questions 
as to compatibility with not only Articles 7 and 8, but also Article 11 EUCFR (freedom of 
expression).
54
 Turning to the issue of whether retention obligations of the kind in the 
impugned national legislation constituted a proportionate interference with Articles 7 and 8, 
the Grand Chamber regarded the interference resulting from the retention obligations to be 
‘very far-reaching and … particularly serious’.
55
 In this regard, the Court pointed to the 
nature of the data to be retained, which made it possible to identify, inter alia, the date, time, 
duration and type of communication.
56
 This information would allow ‘very precise 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been 
retained’.
57
 Given the seriousness of the interference, only the objective of fighting serious 
                                                          
50 At para. 77. 
51 At para. 78. 
52 At para. 89. 
53 At para. 91. 
54 At para. 92. 
55 At para. 100. 
56 At para. 98. 
57 At para. 99. 
crime could justify a requirement for the retention of traffic and location data.
58
 However, 
this objective could not itself justify national legislation providing for general and 
indiscriminate retention.
59
 The Court provided two reasons for this. First, such legislation 
makes data retention the rule, whereas Directive 2002/58/EC requires retention to be 
exceptional.
60
 Second, such legislation, being comprehensive, and not allowing for any 
differentiation, limitation or exception in light of the objective pursued, affects all persons 
using electronic communications services, even where there exists no evidence linking such 




The Court then proceeded to provide some much-needed guidance as to when national 
legislation might be compatible with EU law. It confirmed that member states could, as a 
preventative measure, for the purpose of fighting serious crime, adopt legislation permitting 
the ‘targeted retention of traffic and location data’.
62
 However, such retention would have to 
be ‘limited, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of communication 
affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted, to what is strictly 
necessary’.
63
 The Grand Chamber identified two conditions that would have to be met. First, 
any national legislation would have to set clear and precise rules concerning the scope and 
application of such data retention and impose minimum safeguards, so that persons whose 
data have been retained have sufficient guarantees of the effective protection of their personal 
                                                          
58 At para. 102. 
59 At para. 103.  
60 At para. 104. 
61 At para. 105. 
62 At para. 108. 
63 At para. 108. 
data from the risk of misuse.
64
 Secondly, any national measures would have to meet objective 




The Grand Chamber’s ruling on the second question relating to access by national competent 
authorities to retained data followed similar reasoning. Where national measures allowing 
access by national competent authorities to retained data were designed to combat crime, 
such measures would only be regarded as strictly necessary where access is restricted to ‘the 
data of individuals suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime 
…’.
66
 However, the Grand Chamber did concede that access to other persons’ data might be 
permissible where, for example, vital national security, defence or public security interests 
were threatened by terrorism. In such situations, however, there would have to be ‘objective 
evidence from which it can be deduced that the data might, in a specific case, make an 
effective contribution to combating such activities’.
67
 The Grand Chamber then proceeded to 
establish a number of procedural protections that national legislation should contain. Most 
significantly, the Court stated that, save in cases of validly established urgency, access of 







No case encapsulates the EU’s year, legal and otherwise, quite like Tele2 Sverige. Delivered 
two days after the Berlin Christmas market attack, the judgment sees the Grand Chamber 
                                                          
64 At para. 109. 
65 At para. 110. 
66 At para. 119. 
67 At para. 119. 
68 At para. 120. 
seeking to balance two competing interests: on one hand, the prevention of terrorism and 
serious crime and, on the other, the protection of privacy rights. The ruling continues the 
approach in Digital Rights Ireland, one characterized by an aversion to general and 
indiscriminate interference with privacy rights, even in the face of the very real threat of 
terrorism in contemporary Europe. One may laud the Court for its robust protection of 
individual rights (Scheinin, 2016), or accuse it of hamstringing security services’ ability to 
combat terrorism (Epstein, 2016). Whatever one’s views, the Court’s approach is in stark 
contrast to that taken to the balancing of individual rights against the general interest of 
ensuring euro area stability. Whereas in Ledra Advertising the Grand Chamber was 
deferential to the EU institutions and required the appellants to demonstrate an intolerable 
interference with their property rights, in Tele2 Sverige the onus was heavily on the member 
states to demonstrate that the interferences with individual rights were strictly necessary. 
Another notable aspect of the judgment is the confirmation that national measures relating to 
access to retained personal data by competent national authorities fall within the scope of 
Directive 2002/58/EC. While one might see this as an example of ‘competence creep’, the 
Grand Chamber’s argument that the retention of, and access to, data are inextricably linked is 
convincing. The judgment also provides much-needed guidance to member states as to the 
matters they need to consider when legislating in this area, and, in this regard, clarifies the 
judgment in Digital Rights Ireland significantly.  
 
The ruling’s significance in the UK context deserves comment also. In Watson, the 
applicants, including MPs Tom Watson and David Davis, sought to review the legality of a 
provision of an Act of Parliament by arguing its incompatibility with EU law. A significant 
issue in the debate preceding the Brexit referendum was Parliamentary sovereignty, a British 
constitutional concept that holds that whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is the law, and 
that no other body may question that law’s validity. EU law’s supremacy in the UK, given 
effect by the European Communities Act 1972, however, has empowered British courts to 
protect EU law rights from Parliamentary interference. It is indeed ironic that a case 
commenced by Mr Davis, arch eurosceptic and now Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, 
serves as a reminder of the important role the CJEU and EU law have played in the UK in 
providing judicial protection of rights against legislative interference, a role they almost 
certainly will not enjoy after Brexit. The judgment also has a more prosaic significance. Less 
than a month before the ruling, Westminster enacted the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, 
Section 87 of which contains the type of general and indiscriminate data retention powers 
condemned in Tele2 Sverige. The commencement of most of Section 87 eight days after the 
judgment may foreshadow a decreasing authority of EU law in the UK following the 
triggering of Article 50 TEU.  
  
III. EU Citizenship Rights 
 
Against a backdrop of increasing debate in many member states about the economic and 
social consequences of both EU and non-EU migration, the Court of Justice in 2016 delivered 
a number of important judgments on EU citizenship rights. A theme evident in the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence has been a deceleration of its initial expansive development of EU 





The deceleration has manifested itself in various ways. The Court has, in a manner suggestive 
of sensitivity to member state concerns about ‘benefits tourism’, taken a more restrictive 
                                                          
69 See, for example, Grzelczyk (Case C-184/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:458; Baumbast (Case C-413/99) 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
approach to the citizenship rights of non-economically active EU citizens, most notably in 
Dano.
70
 This has been accompanied by more infrequent utilization of Article 20 TFEU as an 
autonomous source of EU citizenship rights, and greater reliance on more restrictive EU 
secondary law, specifically Directive 2004/38/EC,
71
 to define the boundaries of citizenship 
rights. Similarly, the Court has toned down its once effusive rhetoric on EU citizenship: gone 





Furthermore, where the Court has used Article 20 TFEU to make, from the member states’ 
viewpoint, incursions into areas traditionally understood as matters of purely national 
migration policy (‘wholly internal situations’), it has moved, possibly in response to member 
state concerns, to tightly limit the circumstances in which such ‘incursions’ occur. This 
phenomenon was evident after Zambrano.
73
 In that case, the Court ruled that a member state 
may not refuse residence to the third-country primary carer of a dependent EU-citizen child, 
where such refusal would lead to the carer’s removal from the territory of the EU and, by 
extension, also the child’s removal. This is the case, even where the child was born and had 
lived his/her entire life in one member state, and had therefore never exercised free 
movement rights. The Court reasoned that the carer’s removal in such circumstances would 
have the effect of depriving the EU-citizen child of the substance of his/her Article 20 TFEU 
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71 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
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[2004] OJ L158/77. 
72 See, for example, Grzelczyk (Case C-184/99) at para. 31. 
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citizenship rights. Thereafter followed a number of judgments in which the Court sought to 




The trend described above, with its various manifestations, was observable in the Court’s 
decision-making concerning EU citizenship rights in 2016.  
 
In Commission v United Kingdom,
75
 the First Chamber ruled that UK legislation requiring a 
claimant for child benefit or child tax credit to have a UK right of residence does not 
contravene Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004/EC.
76
 Article 4, when read with Article 11(1) 
and (3), provides that EU citizens who are resident in another member state must enjoy the 
same benefits under national legislation as citizens of the host State. The Commission had 
argued that ‘residency’ in the context of Regulation 883/2004/EC has an autonomous 
meaning, unconnected with any national law definition or, indeed, any right of residence 
under Directive 2004/38/EC. As such, the Commission maintained that the UK had imposed 
a condition that was not present in the Regulation or, in the alternative, was directly 
discriminatory against non-UK EU citizens. The judgment, delivered just over a week before 
the Brexit referendum, was perceived by some as the EU judiciary’s response to UK 
government concerns about ‘benefits tourism’ and the British public’s mood on the subject 
(O’Brien, 2017).  
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76 Regulation 883/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the co-ordination 
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The Court’s move to contain Zambrano also continued. In CS,
77
 the Grand Chamber ruled, 
again in agreement with the UK, that Article 20 TFEU, as interpreted in Zambrano, does not 
constitute an absolute prohibition on member states expelling a third-country national 
primary carer of a young EU-citizen child, even where such removal would lead to the carer 
and child having to leave the territory of the EU. However, the Court did retain the Zambrano 
rationale as the general rule, emphasizing that expulsion in such a situation would only be 
permissible under EU law in exceptional circumstances.
78
 In particular, the Grand Chamber 
stated that any expulsion measure would have to be based on ‘the personal conduct of [the] 
third-country national, which must constitute a genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat adversely affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of that Member 
State, and … on consideration of the various interests involved’.
79
 In making this 
determination, a national court would also have to take account of the right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 7 EUCFR and the best interests of the child, and to 
ensure that the proportionality principle is observed.
80
 It is noteworthy that although 
Directive 2004/38/EC did not apply in CS, since the British-citizen child had never exercised 
EU free movement rights, the Court, in determining the extent of the child’s EU citizenship 
rights, relied on previous rulings related to restrictions to free movement under the Directive 
and its predecessors.  
 
In another ruling delivered on the same day, the Grand Chamber, in Rendón Marín,
81
 
reaffirmed the general rule in Zambrano. Rendón Marín, a Colombian national living in 
Spain, had been refused a residence permit due to a Spanish law that required automatic 
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78 At para. 50. 
79 At para. 50. 
80 At paras 48 and 49. 
81 Rendón Marín (Case C-165/14) ECLI:EU:C:2016:675. 
refusal where an applicant had a criminal record. Rendón Marín was the father and sole carer 
of two EU-citizen children, both of whom had been born and had lived their entire lives in 
Spain. Rendón Marín’s daughter was a dual Spanish/Polish citizen, which meant, following 
Zhu and Chen,
82
 that she could rely on Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC, since her 
situation was not ‘wholly internal’. However, Rendón Marín’s son was a Spanish citizen 
only, meaning that he could not rely upon those provisions, as he had never exercised his free 
movement rights. As such, in the context of his son, Rendón Marín had to rely on Article 20 
TFEU and Zambrano. In its reply to the Spanish Tribunal Supremo, the Grand Chamber ruled 
that Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC preclude national legislation that requires 
that a third-county national, in Rendón Marín’s familial circumstances, be automatically 
refused residency solely because he/she has a criminal record.
83
 Furthermore, the Court ruled 
that Article 20 TFEU prohibits such legislation, where refusal results in an EU-citizen child 
having to leave EU territory.
84
 However, the Court, affirming its ruling in Alokpa
85
, added 
that Rendón Marín’s son’s Article 20 TFEU rights would not be contravened if the family 
could lawfully reside in Poland due to his sister’s dual nationality, since removal from Spain 
would not result in removal from EU territory.
86
 This question, according to the Court of 
Justice, was for the national court to determine on consideration of the facts.
87
 It is an aspect 
of the ruling that may result in much hardship and uncertainty.  
 
It is difficult to say with certainty what is driving the Luxembourg Court’s circumspection in 
the area of EU citizenship rights. The Court’s collegiate judgments can be deductive and the 
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result of compromise, making it often difficult to identify factors motivating them. An 
intergovernmentalist convinced that the CJEU is largely controlled by the preferences of 
powerful member state governments might find succour in the recent citizenship rulings. 
However, such analysis conflates control and influence. The Court’s current President, Koen 
Lenaerts, writing extrajudicially, has stated that the Court seeks ‘to strike the balance imposed 
by the rule of law among the different interests at stake in a multilayer system of governance’ 
(Lenaerts, 2013, p. 1304). There is, accordingly, nothing unusual or improper in the Court 
being responsive to member state government concerns where expressed through legal 
submissions. One may also assert that while there has been a slow-down in the Court’s 
development of EU citizenship rights, the Court has not gone into full retreat. Lenaerts has 
also commented on the Court’s ‘stone-by-stone’ approach to doctrine development (Lenaerts, 
2013, p. 1351). This functional approach, which echoes that of the EU’s founding fathers, 
might involve recognition that ‘Rome wasn’t built in a day’, and that in the contemporary 
climate, if EU citizenship is ‘destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member 
states’, the Court may have to tread slowly and carefully. Whether the Court of Justice will 
continue with this patient development of EU citizenship rights in the coming years is an 
open question. One could characterize the Court’s approach in cases like Commission v 
United Kingdom as a policy of appeasement. If the Court has adopted such a policy, it has 




The CJEU is no longer ‘[t]ucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed … 
with benign neglect’ (Stein, 1981, p. 1). The EU judiciary’s role and decisions have come 
under increasing scrutiny and criticism in recent years. The expansion of the EU’s 
competences, and the political response to the eurozone crisis, has required the CJEU to 
adjudicate on matters of increasing controversy. 2016 saw a cluster of challenges to European 
integration: the legacy of the eurozone crisis, the ongoing migrant crisis, terrorism, and the 
threat of further disintegration following the UK referendum.
88
 The foregoing survey of the 
Grand Chamber’s activities in the past year has shown the Court attempting to wrestle with 
many of these issues. Variances in how the Court has addressed different challenges within 
the three areas surveyed have emerged. In the areas of eurozone crisis management and EU 
citizenship rights, the Court has demonstrated deference to the EU’s institutions and member 
states, respectively. In the context of the threat of terrorism, the Court has faced down 
member state legislatures, having previously done so to the EU legislature in Digital Rights 
Ireland, to protect privacy rights robustly. In the main, however, the survey illustrates that the 
Grand Chamber has continued to develop further the groundwork it laid in seminal decisions 
like Pringle, Digital Rights Ireland and Zambrano. As such, 2016 was a year of doctrinal 
continuity and consolidation, rather than one involving the breaking of any particularly novel 
ground. One might say that in the eye of the storm, the Court has, in stereotypically British 
manner, kept calm and carried on. Against this, one might argue that 2016 was the calm 
before the storm, rather than its eye, and that the most significant challenges posed by the 
spectre of disintegration have yet to come. 
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